DECEMBER 15TH-21ST 2018
The family offices through which the world’s wealthiest 0.001% invest are a new force in global finance that few have heard of
THINK OF THE upper echelons of the money-management business, and the image that springs to mind is of fusty private banks in Geneva or London’s Mayfair, with marble lobbies and fake country-house meeting-rooms designed to make their super-rich clients feel at home. But that picture is out of date. A more accurate one would feature hundreds of glassy private offices in California and Singapore that invest in Canadian bonds, European property and Chinese startups—and whose gilded patrons are sleepwalking into a political storm.
想想资金管理的上层人士，脑海中浮现的是这样一幅景象：在日内瓦或则伦敦梅菲尔(Mayfair)古老的私人银行，有大理石的大厅和访乡间会议室，皆在使他们的超级富豪客户感到宾至如归。但这幅景象已经过时了。一个更加准确的说法是，在加州和新加坡有数百家私人的玻璃办公室，它们投资于加拿大的债券，欧洲的房地产和中国的初创企业——这些公司的镀金的客户正梦游般地陷入一场政治风暴。
1 | echelon ['eʃəlɑːn] |
Global finance is being transformed as billionaires get richer and cut out the middlemen by creating their own “family offices”, personal investment firms that roam global markets looking for opportunities. Largely unnoticed, family offices have become a force in investing, with up to $4trn of assets—more than hedge funds and equivalent to 6% of the value of the world’s stockmarkets. As they grow even bigger in an era of populism, family offices are destined to face uncomfortable questions about how they concentrate power and feed inequality.
随着亿万富翁变得更加富有，通过创建他们自己的“家庭理财室”来去除中间商，全球金融正在发生变化，所谓的“家庭理财室”就是一些在全球市场到处寻找机会的投资公司。“家庭理财室”在很大程度被忽视了，它已经成为了一股投资力量，拥有高达4万亿美元的资产——超过了对冲基金，相当于全球股票市场市值的6%。随着家庭理财室在名粹主义变得越来越大，注定会面临一些令人不安的问题，关于他们如何击中权力和如何助涨不公平。
1 | transform [træns'fɔːm] |
The concept is hardly new; John D. Rockefeller set up his family office in 1882. But the number has exploded this century. Somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 are based in America and Europe and in Asian hubs such as Singapore and Hong Kong. Though their main task is to manage financial assets, the biggest offices, some with hundreds of staff, undertake all sorts of other chores, from tax and legal work to acting as high-powered butlers who book jets and pamper pets.
这个概念并不新鲜；约翰·d·洛克菲勒（John D. Rockefeller）早在1882年就设立了家庭理财室。但本世纪这一数字呈现爆炸式增长。在美国和欧洲，以及新加坡和香港等亚洲中心，约有5000到10000家公司。尽管他们的主要任务是管理金融资产，但一些最大的公司——其中一些拥有数百名员工，承担各种各种的杂务，从税务和法律工作，到充当预定机票和照顾宠物的高级管家。
1 | hub [hʌb] |
The costs of bringing such expertise in-mansion means that they generally make sense only for those worth over $100m, the top 0.001% of the global pile. Asian tycoons such as Jack Ma of Alibaba have created their own fiefs. The largest Western family offices, such as the one set up by George Soros, an investor and philanthropist, oversee tens of billions and are as muscular as Wall Street firms, competing with banks and private-equity groups to buy whole companies.
把这样的专业知识搬到豪宅的成本意味着他们通常只对那些身价超过1亿美元的人有意思，也就是全球最富有的占0.001%的那部分人。阿里巴巴的马云等亚洲大亨创造了属于他们的领地。西方最大的家族理财公司，比如由投资家，慈善家的乔治•索罗斯(George Soros)设立的家族理财公司，管理着数百亿的资产和华尔街的公司一样强大，在公司整体收购领域与银行和私人股权公司竞争。
1 | expertise [ˌekspɜːr'tiːz] |
Every investment boom reflects the society that spawned it. The humble mutual fund came of age in the 1970s after two decades of middle-class prosperity in America. The rise of family offices reflects soaring inequality. Since 1980 the share of the world’s wealth owned by the top 0.01% has risen from 3% to 8%. As the founders of family firms receive dividends or the proceeds of initial public offerings, they usually redeploy the cash. But since the financial crisis there has been a loss of faith in external money managers. Rich clients have taken a closer look at private banks’ high fees and murky incentives, and balked.
每一次的投资繁荣都反映了孕育它的社会。20世纪70年代，在美国中产阶级经历了20年的繁荣之后，卑微的共同基金应运而生。家庭理财公司的兴起反映了日渐加剧的不平等。自1980年以来，世界最富有的0.01%的人群所拥有的财富占世界的份额从3%上升到8%。当家族企业的创始人获得股票红利或首次公开发行(IPO)的收益时，他们通常会重新配置资金。但是自从金融危机以来人们对外部基金经理失去了信心。有钱的客户更仔细地观察了私人银行高昂的费用和不透明的激励措施，然后犹豫了。
1 | reflect [rɪ'flekt] |
These trends are unlikely to fade, as our Briefing explains. The number of billionaires is still growing—199 newbies made the grade last year. In the emerging world older entrepreneurs who created firms in the boom years after 1990 are preparing to cash out, while in America and China younger tech entrepreneurs may soon float their companies, releasing a new wave of cash to reinvest. Family offices’ weight in the financial system, therefore, looks likely to rise further. As it does, the objections to them will rise exponentially. The most obvious of these is the least convincing—that family offices have created inequality. They are a consequence, not its cause. Nonetheless, there are concerns—and one in particular that is worth worrying about.
正如我们简报解释的那样，这种趋势不太可能消退。亿万富豪的数量依旧在增加——去年有199新富豪上榜。在新兴市场，1990后繁荣年代的老一辈企业家正准备套现，然而，在美国和中国，年轻的科技企业家可能很快地让自己的公司上市，释放出新一轮的资金用于再投资。因此家庭理财公司在金融体系中的份量似乎还会进一步上升。随着这种情况的发生，对它们的反对意见呈指数级上升。其中最明显的是最令人不信服的家庭理财公司造成了不平等。它们是结果，而不是原因，尽管如此，依旧值得担忧，尤其是有一件事尤其值得担忧。
1 | newbies |
The first is that family offices could endanger the stability of the financial system. Combining very rich people, opacity and markets can be explosive. LTCM, a $100bn hedge fund backed by the super-rich, blew up in 1998, almost bringing down Wall Street. Scores of wealthy people fell for a Ponzi scheme run by Bernie Madoff that collapsed in 2008. Still, as things stand family offices do not look like the next disaster waiting to happen. They have debt equivalent to 17% of their assets, making them among the least leveraged participants in global markets. On balance, they may even be a stabilising influence. Their funds are usually deployed for decades, making them far less vulnerable to panics than banks and many hedge funds.
首先，家庭理财公司可能会危及金融体系的稳定。将非常富有的人，不透明性和市场结合起来可能是爆炸性的。由超级富豪支持的的千亿美元对冲基金LTCM在1998年破产，这几乎拖垮了华尔街。2008年，Bernie Madoff经营的庞氏骗局轰然倒塌，许多富人上当受骗。不过，在目前的情况下，家庭理财室看起来并不像下一场即将发生的灾难。它们的债务仅占它们资产的17%，使全球市场杠杆率最低的参与者之一。总之，他们甚至可能是一股稳定的影响。他们的基金通常配置数十年，这使他们远不像银行和对冲基金那样容易受恐慌情绪影响。
1 | opacity [oʊ'pæsəti] |
The second worry is that family offices could magnify the power of the wealthy over the economy. This is possible: were Bill Gates to invest exclusively in Turkey, he would own 65% of its stockmarket. But the aim is usually to diversify risk, not concentrate power, by taking capital from the original family business and putting it into a widely spread portfolio. The family-office industry is less concentrated than mainstream asset management, which a few firms such as BlackRock dominate. Compared with most fund managers, family offices have welcome habits, including a longer-term horizon and an appetite for startups.
第二个担忧是，家庭理财公司可能会放大富人对经济的影响力。这是可能的：如果比尔盖茨只在土耳其投资，他将拥有65%的土耳其股票市场。但其目的通常是分散风险，而不是集中力量，通过从最初的家族企业获得资本，并将其投入一个广泛分散的投资组合。家庭理财行业不如主流资产管理公司集中度高，而贝莱德等少数公司在主流资产管理行业占主导地位。与大多数基金经理相比，家庭理财公司通常更受欢迎，因为更长远的验光和对初创公司的兴趣。
1 | magnify ['mæɡnɪfaɪ] |
It is the third danger that has most bite: that family offices might have privileged access to information, deals and tax schemes, allowing them to outperform ordinary investors. So far there is little evidence for this. The average family office returned 16% in 2017 and 7% in 2016, according to Campden Wealth, a research firm, slightly lagging behind world stockmarkets. Nonetheless, tycoons are well connected. Family offices are becoming more complex—a third have at least two branches—making tax wheezes easier. Hungry brokers and banks are rolling out the red carpet and pitching deals with unlisted firms that are not available to ordinary investors. If all this did lead to an entrenched, unfair advantage, the effect, when compounded over decades, would make wealth inequality disastrously worse.
第三个最具杀伤力的危险是：家庭理财公司可能享有获取信息，交易和税收计划的特权，从而使它们比普通投资者表现更好。目前为止，还没有证据证明这一点。研究公司Campden Wealth的数据显示，2017年家庭理财公司的平均回报率为16%，2016年为7%，略低于全球股票市场。尽管如此，巨头们的人脉很广。家庭理财公司正变得越来越复杂——其中三分之一拥有至少2家分支机构——这使逃税变得容易。“饥饿”的经纪商和银行正在铺设红毯——与那些非上市公司达成普通投资者无法获得的交易。如果这一切真的导致了一种根深蒂固的，不公平的优势，这种优势在几十年内叠加，将会使财富不公平状况灾难般地恶化。
1 | privileged ['prɪvəlɪdʒd] |
The rich discover do-it-yourself
The answer is vigilance and light. Most regulators, treasuries and tax authorities are beginners when it comes to dealing with family offices, but they need to ensure that rules on insider trading, the equal servicing of clients by dealers and parity of tax treatment are observed. And they should prod family offices with assets of over, say, $10bn to publish accounts detailing their workings. In a world that is suspicious of privilege, big family offices have an interest in boosting transparency. In return, they should be free to operate unmolested. They may even have something to teach hordes of flailing asset managers who serve ordinary investors, many of whom may look at their monthly fees and wish that they, too, could ditch the middlemen. (1043 words)
答案让人惊醒又显然易见，在与家庭理财公司打交道的时候，大多数监管机构，财政部和税收机关都是新手，但它们需要明确内幕交易的规则，交易商为客户提供平等的服务和平等的税收待遇。同时，他们可以鼓励资产超过100亿美元的家庭理财公司公布他们运行的详细账目。在一个怀疑特权的世界，大型家庭理财对提高透明度是有兴趣的。反之，他们可能会不受干扰的自由操作。他们甚至可以教一群摇摇欲坠的为普通投资者服务的资产管理公司一些东西，其中许多人会看看他们的月费，并且希望他们能绕过中间商。
1 | vigilance ['vɪdʒɪləns] |